The Complex Community Structure of the Bitcoin Address Correspondence Network by Fischer, Jan Alexander et al.








The Complex Community Structure of the Bitcoin Address Correspondence
Network
Fischer, Jan Alexander ; Palechor, Andres ; Dell’Aglio, Daniele ; Bernstein, Abraham ; Tessone,
Claudio J
Abstract: Bitcoin is built on a blockchain, an immutable decentralized ledger that allows entities (users) to
exchange Bitcoins in a pseudonymous manner. Bitcoins are associated with alpha-numeric addresses and
are transferred via transactions. Each transaction is composed of a set of input addresses (associated with
unspent outputs received from previous transactions) and a set of output addresses (to which Bitcoins
are transferred). Despite Bitcoin was designed with anonymity in mind, different heuristic approaches
exist to detect which addresses in a specific transaction belong to the same entity. By applying these
heuristics, we build an Address Correspondence Network: in this representation, addresses are nodes
are connected with edges if at least one heuristic detects them as belonging to the same entity. In this
paper, we analyze for the first time the Address Correspondence Network and show it is characterized
by a complex topology, signaled by a broad, skewed degree distribution and a power-law component size
distribution. Using a large-scale dataset of addresses for which the controlling entities are known, we
show that a combination of external data coupled with standard community detection algorithms can
reliably identify entities. The complex nature of the Address Correspondence Network reveals that usage
patterns of individual entities create statistical regularities; and that these regularities can be leveraged
to more accurately identify entities and gain a deeper understanding of the Bitcoin economy as a whole.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2021.681798






The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Fischer, Jan Alexander; Palechor, Andres; Dell’Aglio, Daniele; Bernstein, Abraham; Tessone, Claudio J
(2021). The Complex Community Structure of the Bitcoin Address Correspondence Network. Frontiers
in Physics, 9:681798.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2021.681798
The Complex Community Structure of
the Bitcoin Address Correspondence
Network
Jan Alexander Fischer 1†, Andres Palechor 1†, Daniele Dell’Aglio 2,3*, Abraham Bernstein 3 and
Claudio J. Tessone 4
1Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics, Universität Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, 2Department of Computer Science,
Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark, 3Department of Informatics, Universität Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, 4UZH Blockchain
Center and URPP Social Networks, Universität Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
Bitcoin is built on a blockchain, an immutable decentralized ledger that allows entities
(users) to exchange Bitcoins in a pseudonymous manner. Bitcoins are associated with
alpha-numeric addresses and are transferred via transactions. Each transaction is
composed of a set of input addresses (associated with unspent outputs received from
previous transactions) and a set of output addresses (to which Bitcoins are transferred).
Despite Bitcoin was designed with anonymity in mind, different heuristic approaches exist
to detect which addresses in a specific transaction belong to the same entity. By applying
these heuristics, we build an Address Correspondence Network: in this representation,
addresses are nodes are connected with edges if at least one heuristic detects them as
belonging to the same entity. In this paper, we analyze for the first time the Address
Correspondence Network and show it is characterized by a complex topology, signaled by
a broad, skewed degree distribution and a power-law component size distribution. Using a
large-scale dataset of addresses for which the controlling entities are known, we show that
a combination of external data coupled with standard community detection algorithms can
reliably identify entities. The complex nature of the Address Correspondence Network
reveals that usage patterns of individual entities create statistical regularities; and that these
regularities can be leveraged to more accurately identify entities and gain a deeper
understanding of the Bitcoin economy as a whole.
Keywords: blockchain technology, bitcoin (BTC), label propagarion algorithm, network science, deanonymization
1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies are rapidly growing in interest, becoming a popular mechanism to perform
pseudonymous exchanges between users (entities). They also allow payments in a decentralized
manner without needing a trusted third party. The first and most popular cryptocurrency is Bitcoin,
which uses an immutable and publicly available ledger to facilitate transactions between entities.
Moreover, given its pseudo-anonymity, Bitcoin has also been used to perform activities in illegal
markets. For example, Foley et al. [1] estimate that one-quarter of entities in the Bitcoin network are
associated with illegal activity. Consequently, several governing challenges have arisen, and law
enforcement agents are particularly interested in techniques that allow tracing the origin of funds.
Specifically, in Bitcoin, given the ledger’s public nature, tracing the funds can be achieved by
inspecting the history of transactions in the system. However, identifying the entities is a complex
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task because they can use different pseudonyms (addresses) in the
system. By the Bitcoin protocol, it is impossible to completely de-
anonymize the entities; however, not all entities prioritize
anonymity [2], and it is possible to find recoverable traces of
their activity in the transaction history.
The structure of the transactions allows, in some cases,
tracing back address pseudonyms that potentially belong to
the same entity. For example, Meiklejohn et al. [3] apply
heuristics and then cluster together pseudonyms based on
evidence of shared spending authority. In this paper, we
study the application of several heuristics that leads to
creating a sequence of Address Correspondence Networks.
Each of these networks includes weighted links between
addresses that potentially belong to the same entity, thus
approaching entity identification from a network science
perspective. Even though other approaches use networks to
model some parts of the Bitcoin economic dynamics (e.g. [4–7]),
to the best of our knowledge, network science approaches have
not addressed the problem of analyzing the Address
Correspondence Network to date. In this study, we show that
the Address Correspondence Networks have a strong
community structure and general-purpose clustering
approaches are suitable for analyzing them. Furthermore, our
experiments suggest that having a set of identified entities
generates large gains in cluster quality—however, this gain
quickly declines, and a small number of known entities is
enough to produce significant increase in the quality of the
detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
explains the basics of the Bitcoin blockchain, heuristics, entity
identification and related work. Section 3 presents our methods
for constructing Address Correspondence Networks, the
clustering technique and its quality metrics. In Section 4, we
discuss our findings, and finally, in Section 5, we discuss
conclusion and future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section introduces the main concepts related to Bitcoin.
Next, it discusses the task of identifying addresses controlled by
the same entity, followed by a reviews of the main studies in
the area.
2.1 The Bitcoin Blockchain
Bitcoin was introduced in [8] as a decentralized payment network
and digital currency which would be independent of central bank
authorities. It is built on a blockchain, an immutable
decentralized ledger that allows users, i.e. entities, to exchange
the units of account (Bitcoins) in a pseudonymous manner.
Entities transacting in the Bitcoin network control
addresses—unique identifiers which have the right to transfer
specific amounts of Bitcoins.
There are different types of addresses, which determine how
the associated Bitcoins are accessed. For example, to spend
Bitcoins associated with an address of type Pay to Public Key
Hash (P2PKH), the entity needs to present a valid signature based
on their private key, and a public key that hashes to the P2PKH
value. Another example is the Pay to Script Hash (P2SH) address
type: it defines a script for custom validation, which may include
several signatures, passwords and other user-defined
requirements. We denote with a an address and with A the
set of {a1, . . . , an} addresses appearing in the Bitcoin blockchain.
Furthermore, we denote an entity as e, with E representing the set
{e1, . . . , ek} of entities that own Bitcoin addresses.
To spend or receive Bitcoins, entities create transactions. A
transaction t is composed of a set of input addresses, a set of
output addresses, and information specifying the amount of
Bitcoins to be allocated to each output address. Formally, let
T be the set of transactions stored in the Bitcoin blockchain, and
P(A) be the power set of A. We model with i : T →P(A) and
o : T →P(A) the mappings between a transaction and its input
and output address sets. The sum of Bitcoins associated with the
input addresses equals the sum of Bitcoins associated with the
output addresses plus transaction fees. Therefore, if an entity
wishes to spend only a partial amount of Bitcoins associated with
the input addresses, the remainder is typically sent to an existing
or newly created change address controlled by the initiating
entity. Transaction outputs that have not yet been used as
inputs to other transactions are referred to as UTXOs
(unspent transaction outputs).
The transaction history is replicated on multiple nodes in the
Bitcoin network. Entities broadcast new transactions to other
nodes in the network. As part of Bitcoin’s decentralized
consensus protocol, specialized miner nodes are incentivized
to solve proof-of-work puzzles that validate new transactions
and group them into blocks. Blocks are sequentially appended to
the blockchain; the number of blocks preceding a particular block
is known as its block height. Furthermore, entities may specify a
transaction’s locktime. This is the minimum block height the
blockchain must reach before miners should consider validating
the transaction, i.e. a transaction with locktime j is added to block
j + 1 or later.
A peculiar property of the Bitcoin network is the
pseudonymity: entities conceal their identity through the use
of nameless addresses (pseudonyms), linking an address to a real-
world entity exposes their entire activity on the Bitcoin network,
since the transaction history is publicly available. Entities are
therefore advised to generate a new address for every transaction,
so that each address is used once as a transaction output and once
as a transaction input.
2.2 Address Clustering
The objective of address clustering is to find sets of addresses
Ai4A that are controlled by the same entity ei. Formally, the
objective is to find a map e : A→ E such thatAi  {aj|e(aj)  ei}.
There exist multiple heuristics for identifying address pairs
controlled by the same entity. We consider seven heuristics
implemented by Kalodner et al. [9], the majority of which
seek to identify change addresses in the outputs of a
transaction (linking these with the transaction inputs).
1) Multi-input: All input addresses of a transaction are assumed
to be controlled by the same entity.
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2) Change address type: If all input addresses of a transaction are
of one address type (e.g. P2PKH or P2SH), the potential
change addresses are of the same type.
3) Change address behavior: Since entities are advised to
generate a new address for receiving change, an output
address receiving Bitcoins for the first time may be a
change address.
4) Change locktime: If a transaction’s locktime is specified,
outputs spent in different transactions on the same block
as the specified locktime may be change addresses. Intuitively,
this is because the entity initiating the transaction also knows
its locktime.
5) Optimal change: If an output is smaller than any of the
transaction inputs, it is likely a change address.
6) Peeling chain: In a peeling chain, a single address with a
relatively large amount of Bitcoins begins by transferring a
small amount of Bitcoins to an output address, with the rest
being allocated to a one-time change address. This process
repeats several times until the larger amount is reduced,
meaning that addresses continuing the chain are potential
change addresses Meiklejohn et al. [3].
7) Power of 10: This heuristic assumes that the sum of
deliberately transferred Bitcoins in a transaction is a power
of 10. If such an output is present, the other outputs may be
change addresses.
2.3 Related Work
Address clustering in Bitcoin has been the subject of numerous
studies. Initial studies focused on the multi-input heuristic. For
example, Nick [10] identify more than 69% vulnerable addresses
using only this heuristic. Also Harrigan and Fretter [11] consider
themulti-input heuristic and attribute its effectiveness to frequent
address reuse, as well as the presence of large address clusters
having high centrality measures with respect to transactions
between clusters. Furthermore, they suggest that incremental
cluster growth and the avoidable merging of large clusters
makes the multi-input heuristic suitable for real-time analysis.
Fleder et al. [12] construct directed transaction graphs for periods
of 24 h and 7 months. In such graphs, the nodes are addresses and
each edge represents a transaction from an input address to an
output address. They obtain address entity labels by scraping
public forums and social networks. By applying the multi-input
heuristic, they identify transactions where labeled addresses have
interacted with a large number of known entities such as
SatoshiDICE and Wikileaks.
Meiklejohn et al. [3] combines the multi-input heuristic with a
second one, similar to the change address behavior heuristic.
They identify major entities and interactions between them, and
note that the change address heuristic tends to collapse address
groups into large super-clusters. Zhang et al. [13] consider
another variation of the change address behavior heuristic,
and show that it improves clustering quality when address
reduction is used as a performance measure. In this study, we
focus on the heuristics introduced in Section 2.2 by Kalodner
et al. [9].
Patel [14] proposes novel approaches to Bitcoin address
clustering. He considers clustering an undirected, weighted
heuristic graph, where the nodes are addresses, and each edge
indicates the presence of at least one of eight heuristics (a superset
of those introduced in Section 2.2) linking those addresses to the
same entity. Each heuristic is assigned a positive weight, such that
their sum is equal to one. The edge weight is the sum of the
heuristic weights for which the corresponding heuristic is present
between two addresses. The author applies a variety of generic
graph clustering algorithms (e.g. k-means, spectral, DBSCAN) as
well as graph sparsification and coarsening techniques to the
constructed heuristic graph. In this study, we propose the address
correspondence network, which is similar to the network built by
Patel [14] However, in our correspondence network, an edge
between two addresses represents the number of times the
heuristics identify the pair as controlled by the same entity.
We use a label propagation algorithm to build the clusters,
using ground truth information to drive the algorithm.
There exist other approaches and extensions to address
clustering. Ermilov et al. [15] show that higher cluster
homogeneity can be achieved when transaction data is
augmented with off-chain information from the internet.
Biryukov and Tikhomirov [16] propose incorporating lower-
level network information to enhance deanonymization.
Furthermore, Harlev et al. [17] extend address clustering by
using supervised machine learning to predict the type of entity
controlling addresses in an unlabeled cluster. In our study, in
addition to using a ground truth to guide the clustering
construction, we introduce a temporal component in the
analysis. We build address correspondence networks for
various time intervals. In this way, we can analyze the
evolution of the network over time.
3 METHODOLOGY
We expand upon the work of Patel [14] by performing address
clustering on so-called Address Correspondence Networks,
denoted G[o,c], where [o, c] is a time interval. Nodes are
Bitcoin addresses that are involved in transactions between a
time instant o and a time instant c. G[o,c] contains an undirected
link (ai, aj) between two addresses when at least one of the
heuristics introduced in Section 2.2 detects ai and aj as belonging
to the same entity. We posit that the topology of G[o,c] encodes
further insights on the identity of the entities and, ultimately, on
the e(aj) map.
For some addresses aj, the controlling entity is known. Using
the block explorer tool provided by Janda [18], we obtain entity
labels for 28 million addresses involved in transactions before
2017. We refer to this data set as the ground truth. The mapping
information contained in the ground truth is denoted with e+,
such thatA+  {aj|∃e
+(aj)}4A is the set of addresses for which
the entity label is known. We use the ground truth to 1) sample
from T and 2) to evaluate the quality of address clustering
methods.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section
3.1 describes the method for sampling from T . This sample is
divided further into cumulative and partial subsets, which are
described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 details the construction of the
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Address Correspondence Networks. We explain our approach to
clustering these networks in Section 3.4, while the metrics used to
evaluate clustering quality are introduced in Section 3.5.
3.1 Transaction Sampling
For computational feasibility, we restrict our analysis to a sample of T ,
as depicted inFigure 1. First, we randomly select a subsetAS0 4A
+ of
the addresses in the ground truth. Next, we select all transactions
involving an address a ∈ AS0 as an input or output,
i.e., T S0  {t | ∃a ∈ A
S
0 : a ∈ i(t) ∪ o(t)}. We then build the set
A
S
1 of addresses that appear in transactions of T 0 but not in A
S
0,
i.e. AS1  {a | a ∉ A
S
0 ∧∃t ∈ T
S
0 : a ∈ i(t) ∪ o(t)}. The
aforementioned process is then repeated in a similar manner. This
involves finding the set T S1 of transactions which include at least two
addresses in AS1, i.e., T
S
1  {t | t ∉ T
S
0 ∧∃a1, a2 ∈ A
S
1 : a1 ∈ i(t) ∪
o(t)∧ a2 ∈ i(t) ∪ o(t)∧ a1 ≠ a2}. We set the condition on two
addresses per transaction to reduce the size of the subsequently
constructed Address Correspondence Networks. Finally, we build
A
S
2 as the addresses appearing in transactions of T
S
1 and not








1 ∧∃t ∈ T
S
1 :
a ∈ i(t) ∪ o(t)}.
As a result, this process constructs a set of sampled
transactions T S  TS0 ∪T
S









An advantage of this sampling method is that the constructed
Address Correspondence Networks are centered around ground
truth seed addresses, thereby exploiting the previous knowledge
of controlling entities.
3.2 Partial and Cumulative Transaction Sets
To study the evolution of the Bitcoin Address Correspondence
Network over time, we create temporal subsets of the transactions
in T S. Each subset includes only the transactions in T S that were
generated in a specific time interval. We create time intervals
using two different strategies, which we name cumulative and
partial, summarized in Figure 2.
The cumulative strategy creates eight time intervals of progressively
increasingwidth,1 {[01.07.11,30.06.y],[01.07.11,31.12.y] |y ∈ [12,15]},
while the partial strategy creates eight time intervals of fixed width,
{[01.01.y,30.06.y],[01.07.y,31.12.y] |y ∈ [12,15]}. It follows that
cumulative time intervals overlap, while partial time intervals are
disjoint.
Cumulative transaction sets are denoted with T S[11s2,yss],
which refers to all transactions in T S that were generated
between the second semester of 2011 and the sth semester of
y, e.g., T S[11s2,14s1] includes transactions generated in the interval







[14s1] refers to transactions generated
in the interval [01.01.14, 30.06.14]. It is worth noting that
while partial transaction sets do not share transactions, they
may still share addresses which are used in multiple
transactions.
3.3 Address Correspondence Network
Construction
Let w : A ×A→N be a function that counts how often an
address pair, (a1, a2), is detected by any of the seven heuristics
introduced in Section 2.2 as being controlled by the same entity
FIGURE 1 | The transaction sampling process.
1We represent dates in the use the DD.MM.YY format.
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(considering only transactions in T S[o,c]). It is worth noting that w
is symmetric (or undirected), i.e. w(a1, a2)  w(a2, a1).
The information captured by applying w to each pair of
addresses in AS[o,c] is collected in Address Correspondence
Networks, defined as undirected weighted graphs
G[o,c]  (A
S
[o,c],L[o,c],w). The construction process is depicted
in Figure 2. The addresses in AS[o,c] are the vertices of the





the set of edges connecting address in two ways:
1) Pairs (ai, ao) such that it exists a transaction t ∈ T
S
[o,c] having
respectively ai and ao in its input and output address sets i(t)
and o(t), and having w(ai, ao)> 0.
2) Pairs (ai1, ai2) such that it exists a transaction t ∈ T
S
[o,c]
having both ai1 and ai2 in its input set i(t), and having
w(ai1, ai2)> 0.
Note that in a transaction, different heuristics can concur by
identifying the same address as a change address, increasing the
weights of the edges related to such an address. Figure 3 shows
the degree distribution of the Address Correspondence Networks
G[11s2,12s1] and G[11s2]. The two distributions show a similar shape,
but note that the left plot is a cumulative graph and the right plot
is a partial graph; this indicates that the correspondence networks
appear to preserve common properties across time. Table 1
provides descriptive statistics of the 16 Address
Correspondence Networks we constructed from the eight
partial and cumulative transaction sets. While the degree
distributions cannot be assimilated to a single statistical
distribution, they are skewed and fat-tailed, features that are
recognized in complex networks of different contexts like
biological, technological or social interactions [19].
Figure 4 shows the distribution of ground truth entities in the
Address Correspondence Networks. In each plot, we compare a
cumulative network and the partial network from its last six
months, e.g. G[11s2,13s1] with G[13s1]. The number of known entities
in the networks from 2012 is small, G[12s1] and G[12s2] do not show
any relation with their pairs. However, from 2013, the similarity
between distributions of known entities of partial and cumulative
networks is notorious.
3.4 Address Correspondence Network
Clustering
Let G[o,c]  (A
S
[o,c],L[o,c],w) be the Address Correspondence
Network for the time interval [o, c]. We approach the entity
identification problem by applying a community detection
algorithm to L[o,c] (therefore assuming that communities are
sets of addresses belonging to the same entity). In G[o,c], highly
interconnected vertices are clusters (communities) of addresses
linked by one or several heuristics. Community detection
algorithms find clusters of vertices highly interconnected but
with sparse links between clusters. Specifically, the Label
Propagation Algorithm (LPA) by Raghavan et al. [20] finds
communities and has linear complexity on the number of
edges O(L[o,c]). The comparative study by Yang et al. [21]
shows that the scalability of LPA outperforms other fast
clustering algorithms, including Leading Eigenvector by
Newman [22], Walktrap by Pons and Latapy [23], and
Multilevel by Blondel et al. [24]. In LPA, each node is
FIGURE 2 | Cumulative and partial transaction sets, and construction of the Address Correspondence Networks.
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FIGURE 3 | Degree distribution for cumulative G[11s2,13s1] and partial G[15s1].
TABLE 1 | Number of nodes, edges and ground truth addresses of the partial and cumulative Address Correspondence Networks for each semester from 2012 to 2015.





2012 1 12 46 10 3,750 164,408 1,553
2 5,054 1,239,850 5,029 8,804 1,404,258 6,582
2013 1 131,252 3,183,594 39,161 139,918 4,587,813 45,613
2 191,453 45,965,678 155,449 329,240 50,552,843 199,614
2014 1 360,002 81,891,103 268,228 607,098 131,854,323 396,548
2 505,748 31,121,336 233,609 1,092,560 162,948,611 621,919
2015 1 232,781 16,836,377 120,191 1,270,261 179,725,740 734,185
2 990,117 52,732,659 211,174 2,184,445 232,416,368 935,599
FIGURE 4 | Distribution of ground truth entity sizes,
∣∣∣∣∣E+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣.
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initialized with a unique label, denoting the cluster it is part of
(the controlling entity of an address). In the basic case, all the
nodes are initially assigned a random label. Afterward, each node
is randomly visited and assigned a label according to the majority
voting of its neighbors. The process repeats until every node in the
network gets a label to which most of its neighbors belong.
Figure 5 shows a clustering for the partial network G[12s2].
To initialize parts of the nodes, we use the information from
the ground truth e+. Let A+[o,c] denote the set of ground truth





+, and let E+[o,c] be the




















In this paper, we are interested in exploring the ability of
community detection algorithms to provide additional
information about the true identities of users. We hypothesize
that the Address Correspondence Network encodes additional
information about the entities that control specific addresses. We
argue that successive applications of heuristics may lead to
connections between addresses controlled by the same entity
that are denser and higher weighted than connections between
addresses of different entities. Following this argument, we apply
LPA to obtain a disjoint set of clusters C[o,c]  {C
(1)







[o,c]. Because of the additional information
provided by the ground truth, we modified LPA to avoid that the
addresses inAI[o,c] can change label, as they are associated with the
actual entity according to the ground truth information.
In the experiments, we vary the proportion p of initialized








∣∣∣∣∣ varies across networks and is an upper
bound on the proportion of initialized nodes, the domains of the
approximated functions also vary.
3.5 Cluster Quality Analysis
Finally, we quantify the clustering quality as a function of cluster
size and entity size. Given an Address Correspondence Network
G [o,c] and set of clusters C [o,c]  {C
(1)
[o,c], . . . , C
(k)
[o,c]} produced by
LPA, we analyze the quality of C [o,c] by defining a set of discrete
random variables to describe characteristics of the network, and
by five metrics: modularity to give information about the intrinsic
quality of the clusters (and inherent topological structure of the
network), homogeneity, entropy, Adjusted Mutual Information
(AMI) and Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) to compare the clusters
with the ground truth labels. Furthermore, all metrics are
measured as functions of the proportion of initialized nodes p.
3.5.1 Random Variables
To study the characteristics of the network, we define the
following discrete random variables associated with the
distributions of entities, addresses, and known addresses in the
address correspondence network.
The first random variable, E, assumes a value from the set of
entities according to their frequency in the correspondence network.
More specifically, E can assume the value e ∈ E+[o,c] with probability
equal to the numbers of addresses in A+[o,c] mapped to e, divided by





In addition to E, we also define variables that assume values in
the entity set according to their frequency in specific clusters. Let
FIGURE 5 | The Address Correspondence Network G[12s2]. Clusters are identified by color.
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Ei be the variable associated to the ith cluster, i.e. i ∈ [1,
∣∣∣∣C[o,c]∣∣∣∣].
For each i, we build a histogram of the frequency of entities in
C
(i)
[o,c], by counting for each entity e the number of addresses
associated to e through the ground truth data in C(i)[o,c]. Such a
histogram is used to approximate the distribution of entities over
C
(i)







be the set of addresses in C(i)[o,c] which are part of the ground truth.




∣∣∣∣∣a ∈ A(i)[o,c]} with
probability:
P(e) 
∣∣∣∣{a ∈ A(i)[o,c]∣∣∣∣e  e+(a)}∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣A(i)[o,c]∣∣∣∣ .
The variable C assumes a cluster identifier according to its
frequency over the addresses in the ground truth. C can assume a
value C(i)[o,c] ∈ C[o,c] with probability defined by the number of




[o,c]) divided by the total




Finally, we define variables complementary to Ei to describe
the frequency of clusters among each entity. We indicate with Cj
the variable associated to the jth entity ej, with j ∈ [1,
∣∣∣∣∣E+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣].
Given the entity ej, we build the histogram of the appearance of ej
in each cluster of C[o,c]. As for the Ei variables, we approximate the
real distribution using the ground truth data, and considering
only the addresses from A+ to build the bins. Formally, Cj can
assume values in C[o,c] with probability:
P(C(i)[o,c]) 
∣∣∣∣{a ∈ C(i)[o,c]∣∣∣∣ej  e+(a)}∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣{a ∈ A+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣ej  e+(a)}∣∣∣∣∣.
3.5.2 Metrics
Modularity, initially proposed by Newman and Girvan [25],
compares the clusters with a random baseline. This is done by
computing the difference between the number of edges inside the
clusters with the expected value of edges using the same clusters
but with random connections between the nodes. Let
∣∣∣∣C[o,c]∣∣∣∣ be
the number of clusters in the Address Correspondence Network
G[o,c], qij the ratio of edges connecting addresses between cluster
C
(i)
[o,c] and cluster C
(j)
[o,c], and ri  ∑
j
qij the ratio of edges with at least




(qii − r2i ).
A value close to 0 indicates that the community structure is
akin to a random network, while values close to 1 indicate strong
community structures, meaning dense connections inside the
communities and sparse connections between them.
Information Theory Metrics: Entropy, introduced in an
information theory context by Shannon [26], quantifies the
expected amount of information or uncertainty contained in a
random variable. Let X be a discrete random variable, which can
assume values {x1, x2, . . . , xk} with probability
{P(x1), P(x2), . . . , P(xk)}. The entropy of X is defined as:
H(X)  − ∑k
x ∈ 1
P(x)log2P(x),








We use the normalized entropy of Ei and Cj to study the
clusters by the perspective of the entities and the one of the cluster
themselves.
Entropy also gives important information of the interrelation
between random variables. Let us consider two variables X and Y,
and let P(X,Y) be the joint probability distribution. The
conditional entropy H(Y |X) is defined as:
H(Y |X)  − ∑
x∈X,y∈Y
P(x, y) log2P(x, y)
P(x)
The conditional entropy indicates how much extra
information is needed to describe Y given that X is known.
Additionally, the amount of information needed on average to
specify the value of two random variables isH(X,Y)  H(X|Y) +
H(Y).
We use conditional entropy to measure the quality of the
clusters. We do it by comparing them with the distribution of
the entities in the Address Correspondence Network,
exploiting the variables E and C. Such a measure is named
homogeneity and is initially introduced by Rosenberg and
Hirschberg [27]. Ideally, a cluster should only contain
addresses that are controlled by the same entity. In such a
case, clusters are homogeneous and it holds H(E|C)  0. The
homogeneity score h ∈ [0, 1] is defined by:
h  { 1 if H(E,C)  0
1 −H(E|C)/H(E) otherwise .
The fundamental Mutual Information (MI) [28] quantifies the
agreement between partitions. In addition to C[o,c], let K[o,c] 
{K
(1)
[o,c], . . . ,K
(k)
[o,c]} be an alternative set of clusters. We introduce
the variable K to describe the distribution of the addresses in
K[o,c], similarly to how we defined C for C[o,c] in Section 3.5.1. The
MI of C and K is defined as:
MI(C,K)  H(K) − H(K|C),
and quantifies the reduction of the uncertainty of C[o,c] due to the
knowledge of K[o,c]. The average MI value between C[o,c] and
K[o,c] tends to increase as the number of clusters increases, even if
there is no difference in the clustering methodology, e.g. if the
partitions are assigned clusters randomly. The Adjusted Mutual
Information defined by Vinh et al. [29] takes into account the
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AMI gets values in the [0, 1] interval, and when two partitions
perfectly match, AMI  1.
Finally, we consider the Rand Index (RI), initially proposed by
Rand [30], which compares two set of clusters while ignoring
permutations. Let C[o,c] and K[o,c] be two sets of clusters. Let
x(C[o,c],K[o,c]) be the number of pairs of addresses from the
ground truth A+[o,c] which are in the same cluster in C[o,c] and in
the same cluster in K[o,c], i.e.:
x(C[o,c],K[o,c])  |{(a1, a2)|a1, a2 ∈ A+[o,c], a1 ≠ a2
∧ ∃C
(i)





[o,c] ∈ K[o,c] : a1, a2 ∈ K
(j)
[o,c]}
and let y(C[o,c],K[o,c]) be the number of address pairs from the
ground truth A+[o,c] which are in different clusters of C[o,c] and in
different clusters of K[o,c], i.e.:





[o,c] ∈ C[o,c] : a1 ∈ C
(i)







[o,c] ∈ K[o,c] : a1 ∈ K
(k)
[o,c], a2 ∈ K
(l)
[o,c], k≠ l}
The Rand Index is defined as:
RI(C[o,c],K[o,c])  x(C[o,c],K[o,c]) + y(C[o,c],K[o,c])∣∣∣∣∣A+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣ × (∣∣∣∣∣A+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣ − 1) ,
where the denominator is the number of address pairs in A+[o,c].
As with MI/AMI, we consider an adjusted version of RI, the
Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) as proposed by Hubert and Arabie
[31], which accounts for chance:
ARI(C[o,c],K[o,c])  RI(C[o,c],K[o,c]) − E[RI(C[o,c],K[o,c])]
max〈RI(C[o,c],K[o,c])〉 − E[RI(C[o,c],K[o,c])],
where E[RI(C[o,c],K[o,c])] denotes the expected value of
RI(C[o,c],K[o,c]). As for AMI, an ARI value of 1 indicates perfectly
matching partitions, while a value of 0 indicates independent partitions.
Warrens [32] shows that ARI is equivalent to Cohen’s Kappa Cohen
[33], which is well suited for the evaluation of community detection
methods, as discussed by Liu et al. [34].
4 RESULTS
We first analyze the size of the clusters identified by LPA for the
Address Correspondence Networks described in Section 3, whose
statistics are shown in Table 1. Figure 6 shows the cluster size
distribution of G[11s2,13s1] and G[15s1], for initialization proportions
p  0 and p  0.1. Note that the density of the small clusters, in
both cases, shifts to reach larger cluster sizes when p  0.1, as well
as the maximum cluster size of G[11s2,13s1]. This indicates that even
a small proportion of initialized nodes, such as p  0.1,
considerably modifies the cluster distribution in the networks.
We also fit a power-law distribution to the cluster size
distribution, shown by the dotted red lines with the
corresponding alpha values in Figure 6. Furthermore, the
power-law distribution fits the data significantly better than an
exponential distribution, resulting in p-values of less than 0.1%
using likelihood ratio tests [35]. The exponents are larger for p 
0p  0 than for p  0.1p  0.1, in agreement with the observation
related to the range of values in the cluster size. In general, the
distributions are very heterogeneous. Additionally, the cluster
size distribution suggests that, from a Correspondence Network
perspective, there is a preferential attachment dynamic in the
address generation where entities that control many addresses are
likely to generate more addresses than others.
Next, we study the behavior of the intra-cluster total degree
(number of edges connecting nodes that belong to the same
cluster) and the inter-cluster degree (number of edges between
nodes that belong to different clusters) as functions of the cluster
size. For the total intra-cluster degree, there are two extreme
behaviors that can be expected. On the one hand, a linear
dependency on cluster size would signal that address reuse is
negligible (therefore that privacy-preserving usage are
commonplace), and the topology of the correspondence
network encodes no additional information about the identity
of the users that control the addresses. On the other hand, a
quadratic relationship (close to the theoretical maximum
∝ c(c − 1)/2) would signal that the clusters are very densely
interconnected, and the actual address reuse is high. Therefore, it
would be possible to infer actual information about the users by
directly inspecting the correspondence network through network
science methods. In Figure 7, the extreme values of the intra-
cluster degree of G11s2,13s1 and G15s1 are above a linear function
(red dotted line) and below a quadratic function (yellow dashed
line) of the cluster size. The same lines are depicted in the inter-
cluster degree distributions showing that the intra-cluster degree
grows faster. By applying an Ordinary Least Squares regression
(OLS), the slope of a fitting line is in both networks bigger in the
intra-cluster case. Furthermore, bigger entities preserve this
behavior, showing that the correspondence network has an
inherent community structure. Thus, this result is not valid
only for entities that control a small number of addresses, and
it follows that it is a general property of the network.
Figure 8 shows the number of clusters returned by LPA,∣∣∣∣C[o,c]∣∣∣∣, as a function of p. The dashed lines indicate the number of
entities
∣∣∣∣∣E+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣ for each Address Correspondence Network. ∣∣∣∣∣E+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣
is a lower bound of the true number of entities, since each
network also contains addresses not in the ground truth. This
is supported by
∣∣∣∣∣C[o,c]∣∣∣∣∣≥ ∣∣∣∣∣E+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣ holding for each test point. In
general,
∣∣∣∣C[o,c]∣∣∣∣ decreases sharply at small p, after which the rate of
decrease slows and stabilises.
∣∣∣∣C[o,c]∣∣∣∣ tends to be lower for partial
networks than for cumulative networks, and can be explained by
partial networks having a lower
∣∣∣∣∣E+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣.
The complexity and structure of the Address Correspondence
Network are stable over time: Figures 9–11 show AMI, ARI and
homogeneity as functions of p. Since these metrics require ground
truth labels, they are computed only for addresses in A+[o,c]. We
observe that AMI and ARI lead to similar results: they rapidly
increase before converging to the maximum value as p increases.
In contrast, homogeneity exhibits no such initial rapid increase,
and instead increases linearly with p. The mean levels of AMI,
ARI and homogeneity do not consistently increase or decrease
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with increasing half-year. Furthermore, the meanmetric levels for
the partial networks appear to be comparable to those for the
cumulative networks. This suggests that the complexity and
structure of the Address Correspondence Network
communities remain stable over time.
The effect of the node initialization: If the cost of labeling a
Bitcoin address is assumed to be constant, the marginal gain in
clustering quality per unit cost from increasing p quickly declines.
Considering that homogeneity remains constant across all p, it
appears that increasing p is cost-effective until around p  0.1. At
this point, AI[o,c] contains most of the information required to
describe the community structure. The observed saturations in∣∣∣∣C[o,c]∣∣∣∣, AMI and ARI suggest that increasing p beyond 0.1 adds
only idiosyncratic community information, yielding little
improvement in clustering quality. This is further confirmed
by studying clustering modularity as a function of p in
Figure 11. Modularity appears mostly constant except for a
sharp initial change, showing a robust community topology
that is consistently detected after initializing a small
proportion of nodes.
To assert the significance of the results presented in Figures
8–12, we repeated the experiments for 100 randomized versions
of the G[11s2,13s1] and G[15s1] Address Correspondence Networks.
The ii−th randomized network was obtained by performing 4i ·∣∣∣∣L[o,c]∣∣∣∣ edge swaps on the original network, according to the
algorithm proposed by Maslov [36], which preserves the
network’s degree distribution. With the exception of∣∣∣∣C[11s2,13s1]∣∣∣∣ for G[11s2,13s1], the randomized results show little
variation. However, all randomized results appear significantly
different to those for the original networks. This suggests that the
(non-randomized) results shown in Figures 8–12 are a
consequence of more complex network properties rather than
solely the degree distribution.
Furthermore, the effect of node initialization order was studied
by repeating the experiments for the G[11s2,13s1] and G[15s1]
networks using 100 random orderings. The node initialization
order does not seem to affect the general level and shape of the
curves. Small perturbations observed in Figures 8–12 appear to
be idiosyncrasies of the chosen ordering, and may be larger for
smaller networks (since the curves for G[11s2,13s1] vary more than
the ones for G[15s1]).
The effect of cluster and entity sizes: Figure 13 shows Ĥ(Ei)
and Ĥ(Cj) for the G[14s1], G[11s2,14s1], G[15s2] and G[11s2,15s2]
networks. Ĥ(Ei) and Ĥ(Cj) are expressed as functions of the
FIGURE 6 | Cluster size distribution of G[11s2,13s1] and G[15s1] for p  0.0p  0.0 and p  0.1p  0.1. The alpha values of the power-law distribution fits are
also shown.
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FIGURE 7 | Comparison of the total intra-cluster and inter-cluster degrees for G[11s2,13s1] and G[15s1]. We also show the lines y  x (red, dotted) and y  x(x − 1)/2
(yellow, dashed).
FIGURE 8 | Number of clusters as a function of p.
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relative cluster and entity sizes, i.e. normalized to
∣∣∣∣∣A+[o,c]
∣∣∣∣∣,
respectively. We run experiments with p  0 and p  0.1. We
note that Ĥ(Ei) correlates negatively with the relative cluster size,
and Ĥ(Cj) correlates negatively with relative entity size. For small
clusters and entities, there are strips of points located at the
minimum andmaximum values of Ĥ(Ei) and Ĥ(Cj). This is to be
expected: if we consider a cluster with only two addresses, both
associated with the same entity, Ĥ(Ei) is minimum. If two
addresses are mapped to different entities, we obtain a
uniform entity label distribution, and Ĥ(Ei) is maximum.
Such extreme fluctuations become less likely as cluster size
increases. Large clusters, therefore, tend to be purer than
smaller clusters, corresponding to a higher clustering quality.
Similarly, entities represented by more addresses are distributed
more asymmetrically across clusters, again corresponding to a
higher clustering quality. This is in agreement with the results in
Figure 7, where the community structure is shown to become
more apparent for larger clusters.
FIGURE 9 | AMI as a function of p.
FIGURE 10 | ARI as a function of p.
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Furthermore, the mean levels of Ĥ(Ei) and Ĥ(Cj) for the
partial networks are always less than or equal to the ones of the
corresponding cumulative networks (comparing row 1–3 and
row 2–4 in Figure 13). This suggests that partial networks allow a
higher quality of interpretation regarding the community
structure. A possible explanation for this is that Bitcoin
entities have less time to obfuscate their activity: the longer
the considered transaction history, the more the obfuscation
attempts accumulate and the more difficult it becomes to
detect the true community structure.
Interestingly, the average Ĥ(Ei) and Ĥ(Cj) increase after
initialising 10% of nodes. The increase in Ĥ(Ei) can be
explained by the loss of small, homogeneous clusters with
low Ĥ(Ei). For Ĥ(Cj), the increase is likely due to the
decrease in the number of clusters, which in turn causes
Hmax(Ei) to decrease.
FIGURE 11 | Homogeneity as a function of p.
FIGURE 12 | Modularity as a function of p.
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5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we consider the application of a general-
purpose community detection algorithm, LPA, to detect
address clusters that are controlled by the same entity in
the Bitcoin transaction history. Specifically, we apply LPA to
Address Correspondence Networks, which incorporate
information from a variety of simple address linking
heuristics. We detect a strong community structure within
these networks by inspecting their intra- and inter-cluster
degrees. We find that the inter-cluster degree grows faster
than the inter-cluster degree for cluster size increments.
Address correspondence networks are therefore suitable
for the application of general community detection
methods from the broader field of network science—this
creates an entry point for future researchers to move far
beyond the application of primitive heuristics.
Since LPA is able to exploit ground truth information, we find
that clustering quality improves as the number of labeled
addresses in the Address Correspondence Networks increases.
However, under the assumption that the cost of labeling a Bitcoin
address is constant, we find that the marginal gain in clustering
quality per unit cost quickly declines. Under this assumption,
we propose that address labeling is cost-effective until around
p  0.1 p  0.1, i.e. until 10% of all addresses in the Address
Correspondence Network are identified. Furthermore, we find
that choosing which addresses to label does not have a significant
effect on clustering quality. Finally, we find that the structure of
communities in the Address Correspondence Network remains
stable over time. Partial Address Correspondence Networks are,
FIGURE 13 | Normalized entropy as a function of relative cluster size and relative entity size.
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therefore, reasonable proxies for their cumulative counterparts
(and far less demanding from a computational point of view).
For future work, we plan to conduct experiments to test the
robustness of the heuristics and specific combinations between
them. For example, analyzing their likelihood and studying their
contribution to the links between addresses. From a network
reconstruction perspective, link prediction is an interesting
approach to improve the correspondence network by validating
current links and predicting missing ones. Additionally, different
machine learning approaches can be implemented to graph
analysis; supervised methods are suitable if more ground truth
information is available in the future.
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